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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine three plaintiffs. The first incurred serious back
injuries as a passenger in an automobile collision.' The second
suffered permanent head injuries as a day laborer in a construction
accident. 2 The third experienced a debilitating asthma attack, caused
by exposure to floor-cleaning chemicals at her workplace. 3 You now
have the chance to advance money to the plaintiff that you believe has
the lawsuit with the highest expected value. If the selected plaintiff
settles or wins at trial, then you receive the money you gave the
plaintiff plus interest that approaches 200% a year.4 Here is the catch:
if the plaintiff neither settles nor wins at trial, then you get nothing.
Ready to place your bet?
Traditionally, a variety of sources-plaintiffs, defendants, the
parties' attorneys, and defendants' insurers-have financed litigation.5
"Alternative litigation finance" ("ALF") refers to financing from other
sources.6 In the past decade, ALF has garnered significant attention
from
news
reporters,
practicing attorneys,
legal scholars,
policymakers, and state bar ethics committees. 7 The rising ALF

1.
See Odell v. Legal Bucks, LLC, 665 S.E.2d 767, 770 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (plaintiff
injured in an automobile collision); Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d
217, 218 (Ohio 2003) (plaintiff injured as a passenger in a vehicle collision).
2.
See Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, at *2 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005) (plaintiff injured in a construction accident while at work).
3.
See Binyamin Appelbaum, Lawsuit Loans Add New Risk for the Injured, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/17/business/
Jan.
16,
2011,
17lawsuit.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/5XF-U3UR (describing a
plaintiff who obtained a nonrecourse advance from a consumer litigation financier in order to
pursue a disability claim against her former employer for asthma that was allegedly caused by
exposure to floor-cleaning chemicals).
4.
You get the money you gave the plaintiff plus interest that approaches 200% a year
only if the proceeds from the lawsuit exceed that amount; otherwise, you get the maximum
proceeds from the lawsuit. The consumer litigation financier gets no more than what the plaintiff
receives as proceeds from the lawsuit. STEVEN GARBER, RAND CORP., ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION
FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES: ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND UNKNOWNS 10 (2010).

5.
6.

Id. at 1.
Id.

7.
See JOHN BEISNER ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SELLING LAWSUITS,
BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2009) ("Third-

party litigation financing . . . has received much attention of late from both proponents and
critics, including practicing lawyers, academics, jurists, and policy-makers."); AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, WHITE PAPER ON ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCE

1 (Draft 2011) (footnotes omitted), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/damlaba/
administrative/ethics_2020/20111019_draft_alf_white.paper-posting.authcheckdam.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/XX33-UVWZ ("[ALF has] become increasingly prominent in recent
years, leading to significant attention in the legal and popular press, scrutiny by state bar ethics
committees, and scholarly commentary.").
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industry currently consists of three segments: (1) financiers that
provide funding directly to individual plaintiffs in noncommercial
litigation, a practice known as "consumer litigation funding" ("CLF"),8
(2) financiers that provide funding to plaintiffs' law firms, and (3)
financiers that provide funding to the corporate plaintiffs in
commercial litigation.9 This Note focuses on the CLF segment of the
ALF industry.
All three plaintiffs described in the introductory hypothetical
exemplify actual individuals whom CLF financiers selected to receive
litigation funding. A plaintiff who receives a cash advance from a
financier is obligated to pay back either (1) the initial advance plus
fees or (2) the net proceeds from the lawsuit-whichever amount is
lower. 10 The plaintiff never owes more than what is reaped from the
lawsuit." The cash advance constitutes a nonrecourse loan1 2 because
the plaintiff is not liable for repayment if the lawsuit is unsuccessful. 13
In this Note, "litigation funding" and "nonrecourse advance" will be
used to refer to CLF and not funding from the other two segments of

ALF.
The rapid rise of litigation funding has not gone without
criticism. Specifically, some argue that consumers are unable to make
rational decisions in obtaining nonrecourse advances due to their
insufficient understanding of CLF contracts, while others accuse
financiers of exploiting consumers with unjustifiably exorbitant fees. 14
Furthermore, some commentators assert that litigation funding
increases frivolous litigation and disincentivizes settlement.1 5
When discussing the effect of nonrecourse advances on
settlement, commentators have generally assumed a rational
plaintiff.1 6 However, behavioral law-and-economics research shows

8.
Other names for consumer litigation funding include "cash advances, legal funding,
plaintiff funding, and pre-settlement funding." GARBER, supra note 4, at 10.
9.
Id. at 8-9. Commercial litigation (i.e., business v. business lawsuits) usually involves
corporate plaintiffs and defendants.
10.
Id. at 9-10.
11. Id. at 10.
12. While "nonrecourse loan" is a legitimate alternative name for litigation funding, the
cash advance may or may not be considered a "loan" under a state's usury laws. See infra Section
II.C.1 for a discussion of this issue.
13.
GARBER, supra note 4, at 10.
14.
See infra Section II.B.
15.
See infra Section II.B.
16. A rational plaintiff is one who employs deductive logic and maximizes utility, or wealth,
when making decisions. Most standard law-and-economics theories of settlement assume that
the motives for settlement are purely monetary; thus, when litigants maximize expected utility,
they maximize expected wealth. See George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of
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that not all plaintiffs are rational.17 No commentator has yet analyzed
how litigation funding can affect a plaintiff who is irrational (i.e.,
subject to cognitive biases).18 This Note provides this missing analysis
and suggests that litigation funding may cause an irrational plaintiff
to reject a settlement offer-even if the offer maximizes the plaintiffs
expected wealth. 19 This Note explores three responses to this problem
and argues that financier mandatory information disclosure, which is
an asymmetrically paternalistic policy, is the best solution. 20
Part II provides an overview of the litigation-funding process,
the service's benefits, commentators' concerns regarding the service,
and the judicial and regulatory responses to these concerns. Part III
introduces a behavioral law-and-economics framework for settlement
and demonstrates that nonrecourse advances may negatively impact
irrational plaintiffs by obstructing fair settlements. Part IV argues
that the best approach to this problem is a policy that requires
financiers to disclose their case-value estimates to plaintiffs.
II. CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF CONSUMER LITIGATION FUNDING

In the United States, dozens of financiers currently exist in the
CLF segment of the ALF industry. 2 1 In this Part, Section A provides
an overview of the CLF process and summarizes the benefits of the
service. Section B focuses on concerns that have arisen along with the
rapid success of litigation funding. Section C examines the judicial and
regulatory responses to these concerns.

Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 139 (1993) ("[E]xplanations for
nonsettlement assume that motives for settlement are purely pecuniary.").
17. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation
Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 109-10 (1994) (stating that
plaintiffs are susceptible to psychological barriers that inhibit settlement).
18.
Please note that use of the term "irrational" varies in different scholarly works and
disciplines. Here, "irrational" matches the definition of "boundedly rational" in Camerer et al.'s
paper on asymmetric paternalism. See Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives:
Behavioral Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211,
1216-19 (2003).
19. See infra Part III. Please note that Part III shows that litigation funding may lead to a
lower settlement rate, but it does not prove definitively that litigation funding will result in a
lower settlement rate. Whether the existence of a nonrecourse advance at the bargaining table
will obstruct settlement through a behavioral mechanism and whether the frequency of cognitive
errors due to litigation funding will reduce overall settlement are both empirical questions.
20.
See infra Part IV.
21.
See GARBER, supra note 4, at 9 ("[S]everal dozen ALF companies provide money to
consumers . . . ."); About Legal Funding, AM. LEGAL FIN. ASS'N, http://www.americanlegalfin.com/
OfficersAndMembers.asp, archived at http://perma.ce/75LS-K6E2 (last visited Oct. 14, 2014)
(listing thirty-two companies in the alternative litigation finance industry trade group).
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A. Snapshot of the Blooming Consumer-Litigation-FundingBusiness
In order to apply for litigation funding, an individual must first
disclose detailed information about his lawsuit to a financier.22 In
deciding whether to grant a nonrecourse loan, the financier calculates
its expected profitability by using factors such as predicted damages,
the extent and types of injuries, the likelihood of a quick and favorable
settlement or judgment, and any liens or medical bills that must be
paid from the lawsuit's proceeds prior to the loan's repayment.23
If the financier approves the loan application, then it provides
the individual with a cash advance prior to case resolution.2 4 In
return, the individual agrees via contract to repay the advance and
any associated fees out of the net proceeds of the case. 25 The fees are
specified in the contract and laid out in a payment schedule or
monthly formula. 26 The financier typically advances no more than 20%
of the expected proceeds of the lawsuit. 27 The amount of funding varies
from $500 to $100,000.28 Interest rates range from 2 to 15% per month
and can approach 200% annually.29 If the individual loses the case or
22. Martin J. Estevao, Comment, The Litigation Financing Industry: Regulation to Protect
and Inform Consumers, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 467, 474 (2013).
23. Id.; see also The Approval Factors for Funding Personal Injury Lawsuits, OASIS LEGAL
FIN.,
https://www.oasislegal.com/legal.finance-services/lawsuit-funding-approval-factors,
archived at http://perma.cc/BA94-RB8N (last visited Sept. 30, 2014) (detailing the "several key
approval factors" that make a case suitable for litigation funding).
24. Nicholas Beydler, Comment, Risky Business: Examining Approaches to Regulating
Consumer Litigation Funding, 80 UMKC L. REV. 1159, 1163 (2012). Some sources include
structured settlement (i.e., a cash advance to a plaintiff after he has settled) within consumer
litigation funding. However, I do not for the purposes of this Note. See GARBER, supra note 4, at 9
("[Aln ALF company contracts with a consumer-sometimes before and sometimes after his or
her case is settled.").
25.
GARBER, supra note 4, at 9-10; Beydler, supranote 24, at 1163.
26. GARBER, supra note 4, at 9; see also ME. REV. STAT. tit. 9-A, § 12-104(2) (2014)
(requiring that all litigation-funding contracts contain a disclosure form detailing the total
amount owed, which includes the initial advance and fees, laid out in a payment schedule).
27.
See Appelbaum, supra note 3 ("To further limit losses, companies say they generally
lend no more than 10 or 20 percent of the amount they expect the borrower to win."); see also
GARBER, supra note 4, at 12 (reporting that two CLF industry leaders have estimated that
"advances average less than 10 percent of conservatively estimated values of the underlying
legal claims").
28. See GARBER, supra note 4, at 12 (reporting estimates of cash advances of $1,750 to
$20,000); Terry Carter, Cash Up Front: New Funding Sources Ease Financial Strains on
Plaintiffs' Lawyers, 90 A.B.A. J. 34, 36 (2004) (noting that LawCash, a large and reputable
consumer litigation financier, "offers nonrecourse advances ranging from $500 to $100,000").
29. See Carter, supra note 28, at 34 ("Those cash advances go to plaintiffs before trial or
settlement, with monthly interest rates ranging from 2 percent to 4 percent in some states to
more than 6 percent in Texas, 8 percent in California, and as high as 15 percent in Nevada.
These rates sometimes are compounded and can approach 200 percent annually."); see also
Binyamin Appelbaum, Lobby Battle Over Loans for Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011,
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has no lawsuit proceeds left after paying medical expenses, attorney's
fees, and other debts that take priority over the financier's interest,
then he owes the financier nothing.30
Litigation funding benefits cash-strapped individuals. Many
people obtain nonrecourse advances as a last resort because they do
not qualify for loans from traditional sources such as banks. 31 In this
way, litigation funding is analogous to subprime lending, which
includes payday loans, vehicle-title loans, and rent-to-own
transactions. 32 Many consumers use nonrecourse advances to pay
bills, buy food, and make house payments-that is, to keep their lives
"intact while they await a complete and fair resolution of their
case[s] ."33
CLF recipients are generally personal-injury plaintiffs with
little to no litigation experience. 3 4 Litigation funding equalizes the
bargaining power between these plaintiffs and the defendants they
sue, which are typically corporations that are familiar with the
judicial system and that have abundant resources at their disposal.35
A nonrecourse advance can strengthen a plaintiffs bargaining
position, deter a defendant from using strategic delay tactics, and
increase both litigants' willingness to negotiate a fair outcome. 36 When

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/10/business/10lawsuits.html?pagewanted=all,
archived
at
http:// perma.cclR79R-5HRL (reporting that the costs of a loan to a plaintiff "can exceed 100
percent a year"); Kirby Griffis, Follow the Money: Litigation Funders Back Your Foes,
METROPOLITAN
CORP.
COUNS.,
July
2011,
at
1,
6,
available
at
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2011/July/01.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/752K-GRBU
(stating that consumer litigation funding can be very expensive with annual interest rates of 36
to 150 percent).
30.
GARBER, supra note 4, at 9-10; Beydler, supra note 24, at 1163.
31.
GARBER, supra note 4, at 10-12; see also Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing:
Another Subprime Industry that Has a Place in the United States Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 83,
84-85 (2008) (arguing that litigation funding should be considered a type of subprime financial
arrangement that "can empower people without access to more traditional credit sources").
32.
Martin, supra note 31, at 95.
33.
Mariel Rodak, Comment, It's About Time: A Systems Thinking Analysis of the
Litigation Finance Industry and Its Effects on Settlement, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 514 (2006)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
34.
See Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance:A Market Solution to a ProceduralProblem,
99 GEO. L.J. 65, 85-86 (2010) ("Personal injury lawsuits typically pit cash-strapped, one-time
plaintiffs against larger entities, often repeat players such as insurance companies or product
manufacturers.").
35.
See Rodak, supra note 33, at 514 ("[A plaintiff experiencing financial pressure has an
incentive to accept a less-than-reasonable settlement offer and may even have to abandon her
case."); see also Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, at *3 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005) ("Proponents of the 'settlement advance' business contend it allows an
injured, often out of work party, to fight off the pressure for a quick settlement.").
36.
See sources cited supra note 35; Patti Waldmeir, Why It Is Good to Gamble on Justice,
FIN. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2007, 3:00 AM), http://www.ft.comlintl/cms/s/0/8613d222-4549-lldc-82f5-
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defendants cannot use tough bargaining tactics to minimize
settlement costs, they are more likely to implement safety-enhancing
precautions so as to avoid litigation altogether. 37 Accordingly,
plaintiffs' access to litigation funding may have the long-term effect of
reducing injuries caused by defendant negligence. 38
B. Consumer-Litigation-FundingConcerns
Along with litigation funding's rapid success has come
criticism. Many commentators, including legal scholars, practitioners,
and policymakers, voice concerns about consumer protection and the
judicial system.
1. Consumer-Protection Concerns
There are two main consumer-protection concerns: consumers'
insufficient understanding of CLF contracts and unjustifiably steep
CLF fees. First, commentators assert that consumers lack sufficient
understanding of contractual terms and thus are not able to make
rational decisions about litigation funding. 39 An inability to
understand legal concepts and terminology, to compare CLF fees with
fees of other financial services, or to speak, read, and write English
may hinder a consumer's comprehension of the CLF contract. 40 Some
commentators even accuse financiers of intentionally concealing or
obscuring important contractual terms so that consumers cannot

0000779fd2ac.html#axzz3Cjok RTBb (explaining that litigation funding can deter defendants
from "drag[ging] their feet to put pressure on cash-strapped plaintiffs to accept a low offer").
37. Rodak, supranote 33, at 516.
38.
See id. (noting that industry supporters argue that lawsuit financing "encourages a
corporate interest in safety . . . [and] serves the general welfare through its deterrent function"
(internal quotation marks omitted)). But see Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, The
Effect of Third-PartyFunding of Plaintiffs on Settlement, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 2552, 2564 (2014)
(using an economic model to show that consumer litigation funding does not affect a defendant's
incentive to take precautions).
39.
See ATT'Y GEN. N.Y., BUREAU OF CONSUMER FRAUDS & PROT., ASSURANCE OF
DISCONTINUANCE PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE LAW § 63(15), at 3 (Feb. 17, 2005), available at http://
www.americanlegalfin.com/alfasite2/documents/ALFAAgreementWithAttorneyGeneral.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/PZR5-8ZVQ ("The Attorney General is concerned that consumers may
not adequately understand the terms of the contracts with the [CLF] Companies and thus may
not be able to make a reasoned decision as to whether to enter into such transactions."); Beydler,
supra note 24, at 1166-67 (noting that CLF contract 'language is difficult to understand and is
likely contrary to borrowers' expectations").
40.
See ATT'Y GEN. N.Y., supra note 39, at 3 (noting the New York Attorney General's
concerns with financier disclosure, legalese, and lack of translation services to the consumer);
Beydler, supra note 24, at 1166 (noting concerns about financier disclosure, unclear agreement
language, and the potential for the misleading of consumers).
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decipher the true cost of the advance. 4' Without knowing the actual
cost of the advance, consumers cannot rationally decide whether to
obtain litigation funding.
Second, while the CLF industry insists that its rates are
consistent with the high risk and large overhead expenses involved in
the business, commentators argue otherwise. 42 Commentators contend
that financiers exploit consumers by charging exorbitant fees. 43 They
argue that the risk of nonrepayment is not high enough to justify such
steep fees because financiers have the luxury of picking the cases that
are most likely to succeed. 44
2. Judicial-System Concerns
There are two primary concerns about the effects of litigation
funding on the judicial system: an increase in frivolous litigation
(lawsuits in which the probability of success is low 4 5 ) and a decrease in

&

41. See Beydler, supra note 24, at 1166 ("Some commentators have accused funders
of ... conceal[ing] important information about the terms of the funding agreement."); see also
John P. Barylick & Jenna W. Hashway, Litigation Financing:Preying on Plaintiffs, 59 R.I.B.J.,
Mar.-Apr. 2011, at 5, 36 ("This is why it is impossible for a plaintiff-borrower (or his or her
attorney or accountant) to calculate the APR at the time [of] the [CLF contract] signing, because
the APR varies greatly depending on when the loan is repaid.").
42.
See Rodak, supra note 33, at 518 ("[C]ritics worry that litigation financiers are able to
target and swindle vulnerable borrowers."); Appelbaum, supra note 29 ("[T]he companies argue
that they should not be subject to existing consumer protections because the transactions are
investments, not loans. They say they must charge high prices to compensate for the risk that
plaintiffs will lose."); see also Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation FinancingIndustry: The Wild
West of Finance Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55, 68 (2004)
("The problem is knowing whether the 180% and 280% rates are really too high [in the litigationfunding industry]."); Rodak, supra note 33, at 518 ("[T]here is disagreement over exactly how
much risk is involved [with litigation funding]."); Anne Urda, Legal Funding Gains Steam But
Doubts Linger, LAW360 (Aug. 14, 2008, 12:00 AM), http:f/ www.1aw360.com/articles/66244/legalfunding-gains-steam-but-doubts-linger, archived at http://perma.cc/JP8Y-BD9V (reporting that
Oasis Legal Finance experiences "some kind of loss" 20 to 30% of the time).
43. See Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc., 915 So.2d 626, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) ("[A]
person who is the victim of an accident should not be further victimized by loan companies.").
44. See Beydler, supra note 24, at 1170 ("[S]everal commentators have rejected the notion
that consumer litigation funding transactions are particularly risky. . . . [F]unders get to pick
only the most promising cases for funding."); Estevao, supra note 22, at 482 (noting that loan
companies "charge exorbitant rates based on exaggerated risk projections" even for cases in
which plaintiffs are likely to win).
45. See GARBER, supra note 4, at 31 (referring to frivolous suits as those in which "the
probability of winning at trial is low"); Geoffrey J. Lysaught & D. Scott Hazelgrove, Economic
Implications of Third-PartyLitigation Financingon the U.S. Civil Justice System, 8 J.L. ECON.
POL'Y 645, 662-63 (2012) (implicitly assuming that frivolous suits are suits that have a low
probability of winning in arguing that third-party financing results in an increase in speculative
litigation); see also Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U.
CHI. L. REV. 163, 185-86 (2000) ("For most litigants and attorneys in the trenches of the civil
justice system, however, a frivolous case is simply a case in which the plaintiff has a low
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the incidence of settlement. First, critics of litigation funding argue
that frivolous litigation will increase because financiers will start
inducing potential plaintiffs to file lawsuits instead of only advertising
to plaintiffs who have already filed. 4 6 Additionally, they claim that
financiers are attracted to cases with high expected values and thus
approve applications involving lawsuits characterized by a huge
potential recovery but a small probability of success. 47 For example, a
plaintiff may receive funding regardless of whether he has a 75%
chance to recover $1,000,000 (a nonfrivolous case) or a 25% chance to
recover $3,000,000 (a frivolous case) because the expected value of the
case, $750,000, is high.4 8 This is possible because a financier can
spread the risk of a low-probability case over its entire portfolio of
approved cases. 49 In this way, the availability of nonrecourse advances
can increase frivolous litigation.
In response, proponents of litigation funding assert three
reasons for why frivolous litigation will not increase. First, a
financier's interest in recovering the initial advance and associated
fees incentivizes the financier to advance money only to plaintiffs with
a reasonable probability of a favorable settlement or judgment.50 A
financier's interest in maintaining a good reputation also incentivizes
the financier to avoid funding frivolous claims. 51 Finally, as of now,
the plaintiff enters into a CLF contract only after retaining an

probability of prevailing at trial."). Although scholars do not explicitly define "low," they seem to
assume that a probability of winning of less than 50% is low.
46. See BEISNER ET AL., supra note 7, at 6 ("[N]othing prevents a funder from contacting a
potential plaintiff and encouraging him or her to file an individual or class action lawsuit.").
47. See id. ("[Financiers] have a high appetite for risk and are willing to fund speculative,
high-yield cases.").
48. The expected value of the lawsuit is equal to the expected recovery multiplied by the
probability of winning ($750,000 = $1,000,000 * .75 = $3,000,000 * .25). See id. at 5-6
("[Financiers] will base their funding decisions on the present value of their expected return, of
which the likelihood of a lawsuit's success is only one component. The other component is the
potential amount of recovery.").
49. See id. at 6 ("[T]hird-party funding companies are able to mitigate their downside
risk . . .they can spread the risk of any particular case over their entire portfolio of cases .... .").
50. See Rodak, supra note 33, at 518-19 ("[It is in a litigation finance company's best
interest to advance only to those plaintiffs who, in its determination, have a reasonable chance of
succeeding, since its investment will otherwise be for naught."); see also Barylick & Hashway,
supra note 41, at 8 ("[Litigation-funding companies] carefully analyze applicants' cases and
accept only those they deem to have a high likelihood of recovery."); Jason Lyon, Comment,
Revolution in Progress: Third-PartyLitigation FundingofAmerican Litigation, 58 UCLA L. REV.
571, 593 (2010) (arguing that a third-party funder's recovery incentives are similar to those of a
contingent-fee lawyer, and thus, "similar [financial] constraints will govern which cases are
accepted"); Appelbaum, supra note 3 (noting that litigation funders "pay lawyers to screen cases,
looking for slam-dunks").
51. Lyon, supra note 50, at 595.
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attorney and filing suit.52 Attorneys are not likely to take up
speculative cases due to their own financial interests. 53
Second, critics of litigation funding argue that CLF deters
settlement because the contractual structure of repayment can
explicitly disincentivize a plaintiff from accepting a fair settlement
offer. 54 For example, assume that $130,000 is a fair settlement value.
Suppose a financier wants repayment of at least $50,000 and therefore
contracts for a repayment of 34% of any settlement above $150,000
and 50% of any settlement lower than $150,000. Such an arrangement
incentivizes the plaintiff to reject a fair offer of $130,000 in hopes of
settling for more than $150,000.
In response, proponents of litigation funding contend that CLF
actually facilitates settlement because a nonrecourse advance
strengthens the plaintiffs bargaining position and deters the
defendant from using delay tactics.5 5 Moreover, they claim that the
plaintiff seeks to resolve the case as soon as possible in order to avoid
accumulating more debt resulting from high interest rates.56
C. Judicial and Regulatory Responses
In recent years, state legislatures, courts, and other governing
entities have responded to the aforementioned consumer-protection
and judicial-system concerns.

&

52.
Rodak, supra note 33, at 519.
53.
See Lyon, supra note 50, at 593 ("[T]he attorney's interest in recovery would prevent
her from accepting frivolous claims on a contingency basis."). There is a substantial literature
about how an attorney's interests may not align with his client's interests and how this
misalignment may affect the decision to settle or go to trial. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients, 5 AM. LAW ECON. REV. 165,
166 (2003) (discussing how lawyer-client interests may not be aligned under different lawyer fee
arrangements). However, this potential problem is not the focus of this Note, and thus, this Note
assumes that the lawyer acts in his client's best interests.
54.
See JOHN H. BEISNER & GARY A. RUBIN, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM,
STOPPING THE SALE ON LAWSUITS: A PROPOSAL TO REGULATE THIRD-PARTY INVESTMENTS IN

LITIGATION 5-6 (2012) (giving a numerical example of how contractual structure could
disincentivize settlement in a commercial litigation-funding scenario).
55.
See Rodak, supra note 33, at 522 ("Since entering into a litigation finance contract
presumably gives the plaintiff the resources and 'threat credibility' to carry her claim to trial,
litigation financing may draw an otherwise obstinate defendant to the bargaining table and
result in a fairer settlement award.").
56.
Id. at 522-23; see also Lyon, supra note 50, at 597 ("Typically, the amount of the
funder's recovery increases gradually over time. Plaintiffs who wish to maximize their own
recovery can be expected to make every effort to bring their cases to resolution at the earliest
possible point in the process." (footnote omitted)).
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1. Responses to Consumer-Protection Concerns

Because financiers are not considered "creditors" under
disclosure regulations, such as the Truth in Lending Act, no existing
regulations could have alleviated the concern that financiers are
concealing or obscuring the real cost of litigation funding.5 7 As a
result, Maine, Ohio, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Tennessee have
enacted legislation regulating CLF contracts.5 8 The table below depicts
some of the consumer-protection features of these statutes. The first
six features were designed to help consumers comprehend the contract
and discern the true cost of nonrecourse advances. Additionally, a
formal agreement between financiers and the New York Attorney
General in 2005 subjected financiers to similar consumer-protection
measures. 59
Table 1. Consumer-Protection Features of
State Litigation-Funding Statutes
Requirements for litigation-fundin contracts
Minimum font size
Itemization of one-time fees and schedule of
repayments
Disclosure of annual percentage rate of return
A five-day, penalty-free cancellation period from the
date of fundingI
Written acknowledgment by consumer's attorney that
the cost of the advance has been disclosed
Translation into consumer's non-English native
language
Fee cap

jME , OH [NE

KOK TN

X IX
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X

X

57. See Martin, supra note 42, at 68 ("The [CLF] industry, however, is not covered by [the
Truth in Lending Act] because litigation financing firms are not 'creditors' within the meaning of
the Act."); Beydler, supra note 24, at 1166 ("[Clonsumer litigation funders operate outside the
reach of statutes that prescribe disclosure requirements for mainstream lenders.").
58. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 9-A, §§ 12-102 to 107 (2014); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-3302 to 3309
(2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (LexisNexis 2014); OKLA. STAT. tit. 14A, §§ 3-801 to 817
(2014); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-51-101 to 111 (2014); see also Mark Bello, Lawsuit
Funding-New Legislation in Ohio, OHIO TRIAL, Summer 2009, at 28-30 (describing in detail the
Ohio CLF legislation). This information is current as of May 18, 2014. Louisiana, Missouri,
South Carolina, and Rhode Island are currently considering similar legislation. Lisa A. Rickard,
Tennessee Enacts Law to Rein in Lawsuit Lending Abuses, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL
REFORM (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/tennessee-enacts-lawto-rein-in-lawsuit-lending-abuses/, archived at http://perma.ce/5ZWR-T49D.
59. ATT'Y GEN. N.Y., supra note 39.
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Tennessee is the only state so far to have enacted a fee cap for
CLF transactions in response to the consumer-protection concern of
exorbitant fees.6 0 Other governing entities have also addressed this
concern. A handful of state courts have brought litigation funding
under usury law, which covers loan interest rates and fees. 61 Courts
typically require the fulfillment of these elements in order to find a
transaction usurious: "(1) an agreement to lend money; (2) the
borrower's absolute obligation to repay; (3) a greater compensation for
making the loan than is allowed under a usury statute; and (4) an
intention to take more for the loan of the money than the law
allows."6 2
Arguably, nonrecourse advances (from any segment of the ALF
industry) do not fall under usury law because the second element of a
usurious transaction is missing. 63 In Anglo-Dutch Petroleum
International, Inc. v. Haskell, a Texas court held that commercial
litigation funding (from financiers in the third segment of the ALF
industry) did not qualify as a loan under the state's usury law.6 4
Because repayment was contingent on a lawsuit's outcome, the court
reasoned that the funding recipient did not have an absolute
obligation to repay the financiers. 65 Thus, the second element of usury
was not fulfilled.6 6
To date, however, no court has adopted this reasoning in the
CLF context. In fact, a few state courts have held that usury law does
apply to CLF nonrecourse advances.67 In Echeverria v. Estate of
Lindner, a New York trial court found a nonrecourse advance to be a
loan under the state's usury law and limited the annual interest rate
to 16% on the repayment.68 In Lawsuit Financial,L.L.C. v. Curry, the
Michigan Court of Appeals held that a nonrecourse advance was a

60.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-51-110.
61.
See Martin, supra note 42, at 58-59 (explaining the relationship between litigation
funding and usury law).
62.
Estevao, supra note 22, at 479-80.
63.
See Martin, supra note 42, at 59 ("It is the second element that is arguably missing in
the typical litigation financing agreement because the borrower's obligation to repay is
contingent on the borrower's success in the litigation."); Estevao, supra note 22, at 479 ("Under
most states' usury laws, litigation financing agreements do not qualify as true loans because the
[litigation-funding company] is denied repayment in the event of an unfavorable judgment or
insufficient settlement.").
64.
193 S.W.3d 87, 96-97 (Tex. App. 2006).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, at *8
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005) (applying usury law to a nonrecourse advance).
68. Id.
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usurious loan under state law and barred the financier from
recovering any interest or fees. 6 9 Similar reasoning was used in
Echeverria and Curry: the risk of nonrepayment for the funding at
issue was so low that the borrower's obligation was essentially
absolute. 70 In Odell v. Legal Bucks, LLC, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals found that a nonrecourse advance satisfied the elements of a
usury claim because the state's usury law explicitly covered advances
as well as loans.71 In Oasis Legal Finance Group v. Suthers, the
Colorado Court of Appeals held that nonrecourse advances were loans
under the Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code,7 2 which sets an
annual interest rate cap of 45%.73 The Suthers court stated that loans
included transactions that created debt contingent on the outcome of
an event such as a lawsuit. 74
Furthermore, under the same reasoning as Suthers, the
Louisiana Office of the Attorney General issued an opinion letter that
classified nonrecourse advances as loans under the Louisiana
Consumer Credit Law.75 Further, the Maryland Commissioner of
Financial Regulation issued cease-and-desist orders against several
financiers under the implicit assumption that the advances are loans
subject to interest-rate caps under state law.76
2. Responses to Judicial-System Concerns
As in the case of consumer protection, prior to the enactment of
state litigation-funding statutes, no existing regulations could have
alleviated the judicial-system concerns of an increase in frivolous
litigation and a decrease in overall settlement. The aforementioned
Oklahoma and Tennessee statutes have provisions that prohibit
financiers from accepting or paying referral fees and from referring
69. 683 N.W.2d 233, 240 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
70.
See id. at 239 ("[P]laintiff [who was the financier] was entitled to an absolute right of
repayment."); Echeverria, 2005 WL 1083704, at *8 ("Is it a gamble to loan/invest money to a
plaintiff in a Labor Law action where there is strict liability? I think not. In fact, it might be
considered a 'sure thing.' ").
71.
665 S.E.2d 767, 778-79 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
72. No. 12CA1130, 2013 WL 2299721, at *1 (Colo. App. May 23, 2013). This case is still
pending rehearing or a grant of certiorari as of September 13, 2014.
73.
Estevao, supra note 22, at 479.
74.
Suthers, 2013 WL 2299721, at *2.
75. Louisiana Consumer Credit Law, La. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 01-160 (2001), 2001 WL
1398739.
See, e.g., Nat'l Lawsuit Funding, LLC, No. CFR-FY2012-128, at 2 (Md. Comm'r of Fin.
76.
Reg.
Oct.
4,
2012),
available at http://www.dl1r.state.md.us/finance/consumers/pdf/
nationallawfundingsettle.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/34W8-DSGQ (one of Maryland's ceaseand-desist orders to CLF companies).
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consumers to any particular law firm or medical services provider;"
these provisions help to prevent financiers from encouraging
consumers with frivolous cases to bring suit. No legislation currently
exists to address the effects of litigation funding on settlement.7 8
In the few judicial opinions involving CLF, courts have noted
the potential adverse consequences of litigation funding, including
frivolous litigation and settlement disincentives. In Rancman v.
Interim Settlement Funding Corp., the Ohio Supreme Court stated
that a third party, like a financier, could encourage "speculative [or
frivolous] litigation" and that the amount owed to the third party
could "prolong litigation and reduce settlement incentives."7 9 In Odell,
the North Carolina Court of Appeals sympathized with the plaintiffs
concerns "regarding the potential negative effects of litigation funding
on a borrower's ability or willingness to settle [the borrower's]
underlying

claim."8 0

In

Echeverria, the

New

York

trial

court

acknowledged that litigation funding could encourage frivolous
lawsuits and commented that the "potentially bigger problem"
associated with such funding is the impediment of fair settlements.8 1
Of the courts mentioned above, only the Ohio Supreme Court
has responded directly to the judicial-system concerns of frivolous
litigation and settlement disincentives. In Rancman, the court voided
a CLF contract by pointing to common law prohibitions against
maintenance and champerty. 82 The court defined "maintenance" as
third-party assistance of a litigant to pursue or defend a case when the
third party has no "bona fide interest in the case" and "champerty" as
maintenance in exchange for a part of the recovery.8 3 The court
reasoned that the negative side effects from litigation funding-that
is, the impediment of settlement and promotion of frivolous
litigation-were the very problems the prohibitions against champerty
and maintenance sought to eliminate. 4 However, five years after
Rancman, in 2008, the Ohio legislature adopted a statute that
overruled Rancman and allowed third parties to finance litigation.8 5

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
Ct. Mar.
82.
83.
84.
85.

OrLA. STAT. tit. 14A, § 3-814 (2014); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-51-105 (2014).
Research uncovered no regulations addressing this issue as of May 18, 2014.
789 N.E.2d 217, 219, 221 (Ohio 2003).
Odell v. Legal Bucks, LLC, 665 S.E.2d 767, 774 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, at *7 (N.Y. Sup.
2, 2005).
Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 221.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 220-21.
OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (LexisNexis 2014).
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No provision of the statute addressed litigation funding's potential
adverse effects on the judicial system.86
While the state courts in Odell and Echeverria recognized the
potential negative consequences of nonrecourse advances on
settlement and frivolous litigation, those courts did not follow the
Rancman court's approach of using common law doctrines to ban CLF.
Instead, the courts in Odell and Echeverriabrought litigation funding
under usury law.8 7 In Odell, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
refused to condemn a CLF agreement under the doctrine against
champerty and maintenance because the plaintiff provided no
evidence that the financier interfered in the plaintiffs legal claim with
the intent of "stirring up 'strife and continuing litigation.' "88
Similarly, in Echeverria, the New York trial court did not strike down
a CLF agreement under state champerty law because the financier's
primary purpose was to profit, not to "bring the suit" or promote
speculative litigation.8 9 Thus, despite litigation funding's potential
adverse effects on the judicial system, both courts declined to ban CLF
transactions.
III. CONSUMER LITIGATION FUNDING AND SETTLEMENT
As explained in Part II, proponents and critics of litigation
funding disagree about its effects on the judicial system. Due to the
hefty monetary and emotional costs of trial, approximately 70% of civil
lawsuits settle.9 0 Avoiding trial conserves both the judiciary's and the
litigants' resources and energy. Therefore, settlement is privately

86.
Id.; see supra Section II.C.1.
87.
Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, at *8 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Mar. 2, 2005); Odell v. Legal Bucks, LLC, 665 S.E.2d 767, 779 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
88.
665 S.E.2d at 775 (quoting Smith v. Hartsell, 63 S.E. 172, 174 (N.C. 1908)).
89.
2005 WL 1083704, at *6.
90.
See Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and Why
Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRIcAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 115 (2009) ("[W]e estimate the aggregate
settlement rate across case categories in the two districts to have been 66.9 percent in 20012002. The aggregate rate for the EDPA alone was 71.6 percent and for the NDGA alone was 57.8
percent."); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle" JudicialPromotion and Regulation
of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1340 (1994) ("[T]wo-thirds of cases ... do settle without a
definitive judicial ruling . . . ."); Rodak, supra note 33, at 520 ("The costs reduced by settlement
are not just monetary, though; they also include, among others, the emotional cost of stress
related to impending trials and lengthy disputes as well as the opportunity cost of what is
forsaken by devoting time to preparing for and attending trial."); see also Korobkin & Guthrie,
supra note 17, at 107-08 ("The high costs of pursuing a claim to a trial verdict have led most
commentators to hypothesize that trials represent mistakes . . . .").
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beneficial to the parties at hand and socially beneficial to the judicial
system.91
When discussing the effect of litigation funding on settlement,
most commentators have assumed a rational plaintiff. 92 A rational
plaintiff is one who employs deductive logic and maximizes utility, or
wealth, when making decisions. 93 Presently, only a couple of scholars,
in writing about litigation funding in the class-action and commerciallitigation contexts, have briefly noted that plaintiffs can be
irrational. 94 Also, the Rancman court has inadvertently provided a
two-sentence example of how a nonrecourse advance could affect an
irrational plaintiff in settlement negotiations. This example will be
discussed in Section III.B.2 below. Broadly, however, commentators
have neither discussed plaintiff irrationality in the CLF context nor
explained the mechanics of how litigation funding could affect an
irrational plaintiff. This Part offers such analysis.
This Part focuses on the effect of litigation funding on the
behavior of the plaintiff during settlement, rather than on the
behavior of the attorney, financier, or defendant, for four reasons.
First, the plaintiff has the final authority to accept or reject a
settlement offer.95 Assuming the plaintiff is mentally competent, an
attorney must abide by the plaintiffs decision even if the plaintiff
makes a cognitive error. 96 Second, while a nonrecourse advance may
influence an attorney's case strategy,9 7 the plaintiff is the one

91. Arguably, trial may be socially beneficial in the sense that "society may benefit from
the information that would be revealed through [it]." STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF
EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 413 (2004). New precedents are set through trial, and judicial
holdings may validate social norms. Id.
92. See, e.g., Rodak, supra note 33, at 522 (discussing the effect of litigation funding on a
"rational plaintiff').
93.
See Camerer et al., supra note 18, at 1212 (iterating the components of rationality that
most economists would agree on). Most standard law-and-economics theories of settlement
assume that the motives for settlement are purely monetary; thus, when litigants maximize
expected utility, they maximize expected wealth. Loewenstein et al., supra note 16, at 139.
94. See Elizabeth C. Burch, Financiersas Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1273, 1306-07 (2012) (noting that plaintiffs in class-action litigation can be subject to
cognitive biases); Maya Steinitz, How Much Is That Lawsuit in the Window? Pricing Legal
Claims, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1889, 1910-14 (2013) (noting that plaintiffs involved in commercial
litigation finance can be subject to cognitive biases).
95. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look
at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 113 (1997).
96.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (2013) ("[A] lawyer shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation . . . ."); see Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note
95, at 113 (noting that when a client is competent, the lawyer must abide by the client's decision
to accept or reject a settlement offer).
97. Some attorneys view litigation funding in a positive light because it relieves the
pressure on "cash-strapped" plaintiffs to accept unfairly low offers and allows the attorneys to
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ultimately legally responsible for any money owed to the financier.
Therefore, the existence of litigation funding is likely to primarily
influence the plaintiffs behavior during settlement. Third, financiers
generally do not interfere with case resolution. 98 In fact, financiers
who are a part of the American Legal Finance Association, a trade
union for litigation funders, pledge not to interfere with, participate
in, or even attempt to influence the plaintiffs litigation. 99 Finally,
defendants pitted against plaintiffs who receive cash advances are
typically corporations, such as insurance companies.1 00 Corporate
defendants are likely risk neutral because they have sophisticated
analytical tools' 0 and experience with litigation.1 02 They are also able
to avoid cognitive errors because of the availability of organizational
review processes and decisionmaking teams.1 0 3 Thus, while CLF
plaintiffs may be irrational, CLF defendants are likely not. For these
four reasons, the analysis in the following sections centers on the

plaintiff.
Below, Section III.A lays out the standard law-and-economics
model of settlement, which assumes a rational plaintiff. Section III.B
explains the behavioral law-and-economics framework of settlementa framework that incorporates insights from cognitive psychology to
show that not all plaintiffs are rational-and examines the effect of
litigation funding on the behavior of an irrational plaintiff.

"press for the settlement their clients deserve." Gary Chodes, The Advantages of Legal Funding,
FINDLAW.COM (Mar. 26, 2008), http://practice.findlaw.com/financing-a-law-firm/the-advantagesof-legal-funding.html, archived at http://perma.ccl399C-2VWE.
98. Gary Chodes, Four Myths About Legal Funding, FINDLAw.coM (Mar. 26, 2008),
http://practice.findlaw.com/financing-a-law-firm/four-myths-about-legal-funding.html,
archived
at http://perma.cc/9JLA-J8EM.
99. Industry Best Practices-ALFA's Code of Conduct, AM. LEGAL FIN. Assoc.,
http://www.americanlegalfin.com/IndustryBestPractices.asp
(last visited Sept. 14, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/8NXJ-WGUY.
100. See Molot, supra note 34, at 85-86 ("Personal injury lawsuits typically pit cashstrapped, one-time plaintiffs against larger entities, often repeat players such as insurance
companies or product manufacturers.").
101. See, e.g., Tony Bartleme, Storm of Money: Insider Tells How Some Insurance
Companies
Rig
the
System,
POST
COURIER
(Dec.
2,
2012,
12:29
AM),
http://www.postandcourier.com/article/ 20121202/PC16/121209871, archived at http://perma.cc/
37GJ-SYEF ("Today, insurers have an array of computer programs that guide the flow of trillions
of dollars to and from customers around the world.").
102. See, e.g., Molot, supra note 34, at 72 (describing the "repeat-player" defendant as
"risk[] neutral").
103. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The UncertainPsychological Case for Paternalism,97 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1165, 1214 (2002) (explaining how organizations have the ability to avoid cognitive
errors).
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A. StandardLaw-and-Economics Model of Settlement
The standard law-and-economics model of settlement assumes
that both litigants are rational actors.1 04 This means that litigants
optimally invest in the information needed for a settlement decision,
make accurate and logical inferences from the acquired information,
and choose to settle only if the option maximizes their expected utility,
or wealth. 0 5 This expected-utility model assumes that litigants will be
risk neutral or risk averse in their decisions to settle or go to trial.106
Trial involves more uncertainty and is thus riskier than settlement. If
a plaintiff is risk neutral, then he is indifferent between a $50,000
settlement value and a $50,000 trial value. If a plaintiff is risk averse,
or dislikes the uncertainty involved with trial, then he prefers the
$50,000 settlement.
Under the standard model, a plaintiff is willing to accept a
settlement if the settlement value is greater than or equal to his net
expected value of trial.10 7 The plaintiffs net expected value of trial is
equal to the plaintiffs expected value of trial (i.e., the likelihood of a
favorable judgment multiplied by the anticipated award) minus trial
costs. 08 On the other side, a defendant is willing to give the plaintiff
an amount less than or equal to his net expected value of trial.109 The

104. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1984) (presenting an economic model of litigation in which litigants form
rational expectations of the consequences of trial and settlement and then act based upon those
expectations); see also Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 17, at 108-09 (explaining the standard
law-and-economics model of settlement).
105. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Heuristics and Biases at the Bargaining Table, 87
MARQ. L. REV. 795, 795-96 (2004).
106. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L.
REV. 113, 113, 119 (1996):
Current theories of litigation fail to account for the possibility that litigants'
decisionmaking under risk and uncertainty may not comport with rational theories of
behavior... . The [standard] law and economics literature asserts that litigants will
make either risk-neutral or risk-averse decisions, depending upon their wealth ....
107. See Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 17, at 111 ("A plaintiff will be willing to accept a
settlement offer in the amount of a favorable judgment multiplied by the likelihood of a favorable
judgment, minus trial costs, plus out-of-court settlement costs."); Loewenstein et al., supra note
16, at 136 ("[A]ny settlement above the expected value minus anticipated costs is desirable for a
plaintiff. . . .").
108. See sources cited supra note 107.
109. See Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 17, at 111 ("[A] defendant will be willing to settle
for an amount equal to the cost of an adverse trial judgment multiplied by the percentage chance
of losing the case, plus trial costs, minus out-of-court settlement costs."); Loewenstein et al.,
supra note 16, at 136 ("[A]ny settlement below the expected value plus anticipated costs is
desirable for a defendant.").
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defendant's net expected value of trial is equal to the plaintiffs
expected value of trial plus anticipated trial costs. 110
For example, suppose trial costs are $10,000 each for the
plaintiff and defendant, and the plaintiff has a 50% chance of winning
a $100,000 award. The standard model predicts that the plaintiff is
willing to accept any amount greater than or equal to $40,000 (i.e.,
.50*$100,000-$10,000), and the defendant is willing to pay any
amount less than or equal to $60,000 (i.e., .50*$100,000+$10,000).
Thus, the lawsuit should settle for an amount between $40,000 and
$60,000, which is the "viable bargaining range.""
The most commonly tested and referenced explanation for
bargaining impasse in settlement under the standard model is the
Priest-Klein theory. 112 Under this theory, rational litigants possess
imperfect information about the case, so litigants estimate the case
value with error. 113 A case will not settle if the plaintiff overestimates
the expected value of trial, the defendant underestimates the expected
value of trial, or both; that is, a case will not settle if the litigants'
errors eliminate the viable bargaining range. 114
Recall the aforementioned example: trial costs are $10,000 each
for the plaintiff and defendant, and the plaintiff has a 50% chance of
winning a $100,000 award. The viable bargaining range is $40,000 to
$60,000. Now assume the defendant underestimates the expected
value of trial and believes that the plaintiff has only a 40% chance of
winning $100,000. Thus, he is willing to pay the plaintiff any amount
less than or equal to $50,000 (i.e., .40*$100,000+$10,000). Also
assume that the plaintiff overestimates the expected value of trial and
believes that he has a 70% chance of winning $100,000. Therefore, he
is willing to accept any amount greater than or equal to $60,000 (i.e.,
.70*$100,000-$10,000). Because the estimation errors of the plaintiff
and defendant together eliminate the viable bargaining range, the
case does not settle.
Although bargaining impasse can occur under the Priest-Klein
theory, this theory assumes that litigants do not systematically
overestimate or underestimate the expected value of trial.1 15 This

110. See sources cited supra note 109.
111. The viable bargaining range can also be called the "settlement zone." See Loewenstein
et al., supra note 16, at 136.
112. See Priest & Klein, supra note 104, at 1; see also Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 17, at
111-14 (explaining the assumptions underlying the Priest-Klein model, which the authors deem
to be the best representation of the standard economic account of settlement).
113. Loewenstein et al., supra note 16, at 136.
114. Id. at 136-37.
115. Id. at 139.
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means that the direction of the litigants' estimation errors is
unpredictable: "it is just as likely that the defendant's expectation [of
trial] is greater than the plaintiff['s] expectation[] as the reverse." 1 6
In other words, some errors lead to more settlement; some lead to less
settlement. Thus, the average effect of the estimation errors on the
settlement rate is zero.
B. Behavioral Law-and-Economics Framework for Settlement
Unlike the standard law-and-economics model, the behavioral
law-and-economics model of settlement decisionmaking incorporates
insights from cognitive psychology. Under the standard model, people
are assumed to have unbounded rationality (i.e., unlimited cognitive
abilities) and use faultless deductive logic when making decisions.17
Studies from cognitive psychology reveal that this is not the case, as
people have limited computational skills and flawed memories.1 1 8
Decisionmakers may use mental shortcuts called heuristics to "reduce
the complexity and effort involved in the reasoning process."11 9
Heuristics may be employed consciously or unconsciously. 120 This Note
defines an "irrational" person to be one who employs heuristics.121
The use of heuristics sometimes may be reasonable because it
saves time and effort in decisionmaking. 122 However, employing these
shortcuts may lead to cognitive errors and produce outcomes that do
not maximize expected wealth.1 23 A plaintiff may use a heuristic in a
settlement decision, make a cognitive error, and end up going to trial
even when the net expected value of trial is lower than the settlement
value.1 24 In contrast to the errors referenced in the Priest-Klein

116. Linda Babcock et al., Creating Convergence: DebiasingBiased Litigants, 22 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 913, 920 (1998).
117. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law-and-Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471, 1477 ("[Hluman behavior differs in systematic ways from that predicted by the
standard economic model of unbounded rationality.").
118. Id.
119. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 105, at 796-97.
120. Id.
121. See supra note 18.
122. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 105, at 796-97.
123. See Jolls et al., supra note 117, at 1477 ("Even when the use of mental shortcuts is
rational, it can produce predictable mistakes. . . . [Alctual decisions often violate the axioms of
expected utility theory.").
124. See Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 17, at 117:
Psychological barriers, which are cognitive and perceptual in nature, prevent
disputants from acting in a value-maximizing, utilitarian manner. . . . Our general
conclusion is that these psychological constructs can cause legal disputes to go to trial
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hypothesis, cognitive errors caused by the use of heuristics can result
in systematic overestimation or underestimation of the expected value
of trial. 125 This means that cognitive errors may be so prevalent in one
direction that they cause a decrease (or increase) in the overall
settlement rate.1 2 6 Fortunately, the direction of these errors can be
predicted, making it possible for policies to be implemented to correct
the errors. 127
In a settlement negotiation, the plaintiff must perform two
cognitive tasks: judgment and choice.1 28 "Judgment" occurs when the
plaintiff evaluates his expected payoffs under the options of
settlement and trial.1 29 When the plaintiff picks an option, he makes a
"choice." 3 0 Although there are many different heuristics that affect
each task,13 1 this Note focuses on the two heuristics with which
litigation funding is most likely to interact: self-serving bias at the
judgment stage and framing at the choice stage.
1. From Optimistic to Overoptimistic: Litigation Funding and the SelfServing Bias
At the judgment stage, litigation funding can increase a
Using
settlement.
plaintiffs self-serving bias and impede
experimental studies as evidence, this Section explains how the selfserving bias affects plaintiffs. It then employs a numerical example to
show how a nonrecourse advance can exacerbate a plaintiffs selfserving bias through an "endorsement effect" and eliminate the viable
bargaining range during settlement.

even when there is a viable bargaining range and no strategic behavior by the
disputants.
125. See Loewenstein et al., supra note 16, at 138-39 ("[Pllaintiffs are likely to
systematically overestimate the value of their claims, and defendants are likely to underestimate
the value of claims brought against them.").
126. Id.
127. See Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be
Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 71 (2002)
("Because these irrational tendencies are supposedly uniform, pervasive, and predictable, they
can be incorporated into behavioral models and used in policy analysis.").
128. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 105, at 798.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 798-805 (explaining how anchoring and adjustment, availability, and selfserving evaluations can affect judgment while framing, status quo bias, contrast effects, and
reactive devaluation can affect choice); see also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124-30 (1974) (describing three
heuristics-representativeness, availability, and adjustment from an anchor-that may affect
decisionmaking).
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Self-serving bias leads people to judge options with uncertain
outcomes, such as trial, as more beneficial than the options objectively
are. 13 2 The employment of this heuristic may lead to predictable
estimation errors. Systematically, plaintiffs are likely to overestimate,
while defendants are likely to underestimate, the expected value of
trial. 133
An experiment based on a Texas tort case provides convincing
evidence that the self-serving bias may cause litigants to have
systematically different estimates of trial awards and, in turn,
systematically different conceptions of fair settlement valuesdifferences that can lead to bargaining breakdown. 134 Subjects in the
study were randomly assigned the role of plaintiff or defendant and
then given identical case materials (e.g., testimonies, police reports,
and maps) abstracted from a real Texas automobile-collision case. 13 5
Each subject was asked to estimate the amount awarded by the Texas
judge, formulate a fair settlement value, and then negotiate with a
subject assigned to the role of the other litigant. 136 Finally, the
subjects were asked to recall and rate the importance of arguments
found in the case materials that were in support of and against their
positions. 137
The award estimates of the subjects in the role of the plaintiff
("plaintiffs") were on average $14,527 higher than the estimates of
those in the role of the defendant ("defendants"). 1 3 8 Accordingly, the
settlement values of plaintiffs were on average $17,709 higher than
the values of defendants. 139 Both differences were highly statistically
significant. 140 A large difference in fair settlement values led to
bargaining impasse between the plaintiff and his assigned
defendant. 14 1 Additionally, plaintiffs recalled 1.04 more importanceweighted arguments favoring themselves; defendants recalled 2.79

132. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 105, at 800-01.
133. See Loewenstein et al., supra note 16, at 138-39 ("[P]laintiffs are likely to
systematically overestimate the value of their claims, and defendants are likely to underestimate
the value of claims brought . . . .").
134. See id. at 153 ("Our experiment provides strong evidence for the existence of a selfserving bias.").
135. Id. at 145.
136. Id. at 145-46.
137. See id. ("Finally, after the negotiation ended, we asked both parties to recall and rate
the importance of arguments favoring both the plaintiff and the defendant.").
138. Id. at 150.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 157 ("Self-serving biases create a genuine dilemma for the resolution of legal
disputes.").
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more importance-weighted arguments favoring themselves. 142 This
selective recall of arguments favoring the litigant's own position
provides evidence that each party was evaluating trial in a selfserving way.
Those who obtain litigation funding are typically personalinjury plaintiffs and likely susceptible to self-serving bias, just as the
aforementioned subjects in the role of the plaintiff were. Prior to
obtaining a nonrecourse advance, a plaintiff may initially have (1) no
self-serving bias, (2) self-serving bias of a magnitude that is
insufficient to eliminate the viable bargaining range, or (3) selfserving bias of a magnitude large enough to impede settlement. In the
first two cases where initial self-serving bias does not obstruct
settlement, litigation funding-through an "endorsement effect"-can
increase the magnitude of the plaintiffs self-serving bias to such a
degree that settlement is impeded. From the plaintiffs perspective,
the financier's approval of a nonrecourse advance may serve as a
stamp of approval or an "endorsement" of the plaintiffs self-serving
assessment of the case. A plaintiff may perceive CLF application
approval as evidence of the strength of his case or as another
"argument" favoring his case. This perception stems from financier
statements, such as "[w]e have to believe in the case [we fund]," which
in reality reflect financier efforts to bolster its reputation rather than
an actual endorsement of the plaintiffs case. 43
If the endorsement increases the plaintiffs self-serving bias to
the degree that the viable bargaining range is eliminated, then the
plaintiff may choose to go to trial even when the net expected value of
trial is lower than the settlement value. A numerical example of how
this works follows. Recall the example in Section III.A: trial costs are
$10,000 each for the plaintiff and defendant, and the plaintiff has a
50% chance of winning a $100,000 award. The viable bargaining range
is $40,000 to $60,000. Assume the defendant correctly estimates the
expected value of trial and is willing to pay the plaintiff any amount
less than or equal to $60,000. Suppose that prior to receiving litigation
funding, the plaintiff overestimates the expected value of trial because
of a moderate degree of self-serving bias and believes that he has a
60% chance of winning $100,000. Thus, he is willing to accept any
amount greater than or equal to $50,000 (i.e., .60*$100,000-$10,000).
At this point, the plaintiffs initial self-serving bias has narrowed, but

142. Id. at 151.
143. See Mary Wisniewski, Legal Financing Helps Little Guys Level the Playing Field,
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Nov. 30, 2005, at 73, availableat LexisNexis (reporting that the president
of a CLF company said that the firm has to "believe in the case" in order to finance it).
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not eliminated, the viable bargaining range to between $50,000 and
$60,000.
Next, suppose the plaintiff obtains a nonrecourse advance and
perceives CLF application approval to be an endorsement of his case.
This exacerbates the plaintiffs self-serving bias so that he now
believes he has an 80% chance of winning $100,000. Thus, the plaintiff
is willing to accept any amount greater than or equal to $70,000 (i.e.,
.80*$100,000-$10,000).
Because the plaintiffs overestimation
eliminates the viable bargaining range, the case does not settle. In
sum, litigation funding can increase self-serving bias on the part of the
plaintiff and thus decrease the percentage of cases that settle.
2. Winner or Loser? Litigation Funding and Framing
While litigation funding can negatively affect an irrational
plaintiff at the judgment stage via self-serving bias, it can also
negatively affect an irrational plaintiff at the choice stage via the
framing heuristic. This Section employs experimental studies to
explain how the framing heuristic affects plaintiffs. It then provides a
numerical example to demonstrate how a nonrecourse advance can
impede settlement by causing a fair offer to appear as a loss. Finally,
this Section concludes by discussing the illustration in Rancman of
how litigation funding can adversely affect a plaintiff who is
susceptible to framing.
The framing heuristic comes from prospect theory. 144 In the
context of litigation, prospect theory states that when parties choose
between a certain settlement outcome and an uncertain trial outcome,
they evaluate the options relative to a reference point. 1 45 From the
reference point, an outcome may appear to be a "gain" or a "loss."146
Litigants tend to weigh losses more heavily than gains of the same
value,1 47 a phenomenon known as "loss aversion." 148 From a "gains
144. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 274-89 (1979). For an easy-to-understand explanation of prospect
theory, see Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 Nw. U. L. REV.
1115, 1117-19 (2003).
145. See Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 105, at 802:
When choosing between an option with a known outcome and one with an uncertain
outcome, research demonstrates that individuals often consider not only the expected
value of each choice, but also whether the possible outcomes appear to be "gains" or
"losses" relative to a reference point, typically the status quo.
146. Id.
147. Guthrie, supra note 144, at 1119.
148. Tversky and Kahneman, the founders of prospect theory, discovered and coined "loss
aversion." See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A ReferenceDependent Model, 106 Q.J. ECoN. 1039, 1039 (1991).
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frame," litigants prefer the risk-averse option of settlement.1 49 In
contrast, from a "loss frame," litigants prefer the risk-seeking option of
5 0 For example, suppose
trial.o
trial costs are zero, and a plaintiff has a
50% chance of winning a $100,000 award. The defendant offers the
plaintiff $50,000 to settle. If the plaintiff views $50,000 as a gain (i.e.,
the plaintiffs reference point is lower than $50,000), then he will
likely choose settlement over trial. If a plaintiff views $50,000 as a loss
(i.e., the plaintiffs reference point is higher than $50,000), then he
will likely choose trial over settlement.
Some scholars theorize that plaintiffs consistently operate in a
gains frame, choosing between a sure positive settlement and the
prospect of winning more at trial.15 1 These scholars also predict that
defendants consistently operate in a loss frame, choosing between a
sure negative settlement and the prospect of losing more at trial.15 2
This theory assumes that the reference point is the same for all
plaintiffs and defendants, but experimental evidence suggests that
litigation does not actually provide a consistent frame for the parties
involved.
For instance, in one experimental study that utilized a
simplified liability scenario involving a real-world automobile
accident, all subjects took on the role of the plaintiff. 5 3 In the
hypothetical presented, the plaintiff suffered $28,000 worth of
damages in a car accident that was not the plaintiffs fault.1 54 The
defendant was the responsible party's insurance carrier that had
conceded liability.15 5 The only thing in dispute was whether the
insurance policy limited the carrier's liability to $10,000.16 Because
the plaintiffs attorney told the plaintiff that the case could go either

149. Guthrie, supra note 144, at 1118.
150. Id. In the settlement context, scholars often conflate loss aversion and risk preferences.
In the purest sense, we can measure risk preferences by looking at variance in the potential trial
outcome. A person who is risk averse will pay more when the variance is higher in the potential
trial outcome; a person who is risk seeking will pay less when the variance is higher in the
potential trial outcome. For a study that attempts to examine risk preferences in this way in the
context of settlement, see Linda Babcock et al., Forming Beliefs About Adjudicated Outcomes:
Perceptionsof Risk and Reservation Values, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 289 (1995).
151. See Rachlinski, supra note 106, at 129 (explaining how litigation naturally supplies a
gains frame for plaintiffs and loss frame for defendants).
152. Id.
153. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 17, at 131. It is important to note that the authors
eliminated transaction costs of trial, such as discovery costs, in this experimental setting. Id. at
124-25.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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way at trial, 15 7 the subjects could infer that the expected value of trial
was $19,000 (i.e., .50*$28,000+.50*$10,000).158
The subjects of the study were divided into two groups.1 5 9
Group A was told that the plaintiff was driving a $14,000 Toyota
Corolla, which was destroyed in the accident, and had incurred
$14,000 in medical bills, which the plaintiffs health insurance
company had already paid.160 Group B was told that the plaintiff was
driving a $24,000 BMW, which was destroyed in the accident, and had
incurred $4,000 in medical bills, which the plaintiffs health insurance
company had already paid. 161 All subjects were asked to respond to the
defendant's offer of $21,000 to settle the case; they could choose (1)
definitely accept, (2) probably accept, (3) undecided, (4) probably
reject, or (5) definitely reject.162
Under the standard model of settlement, all subjects should
have picked choice (1) or (2) because $21,000 is greater than $19,000,
and there should have been no significant difference in the average
response between the groups. However, Group A subjects responded
that they would definitely or probably accept the offer more frequently
than Group B subjects, and the difference in the groups' average
responses was highly statistically significant.163 The authors
concluded that the difference was due to framing and that the car
brands and the already-paid medical bills framed the decision: those
in Group A considered the settlement to be a gain because they would
end up with $7,000, but those in Group B considered the settlement to
be a loss because they would end up with -$3,000.164 Given that all
subjects took on the role of the plaintiff, this study demonstrates that
litigation does not necessarily provide a gains frame for all

157. Id.
158. In an extension of the experiment to lawyers, Russell Korobkin and Chris Guthrie
comment that "[t]he attorney's inability to predict which trial outcome was more likely suggests
that the trial option could be described as a fifty percent chance of recovering $28,000 coupled
with a fifty percent chance of recovering $10,000; that is, an option with a $19,000 expected
value. . . ." Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 95, at 98.
159. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 17, at 132.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 131-33.
163. Id. at 133.
164. See id. at 132 ("[A]ccepting the $21,000 offer would leave Group A subjects better off
financially than they were prior to the accident (-$28,000+$14,000+$21,000 = $7,000). The same
offer would leave Group B subjects in a worse position than before the accident occurred
(-$28,000+$4,000+$21,000 = -$3,000).").
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plaintiffs. 6 5 Instead, the reference point varies from plaintiff to
plaintiff.
The reference point is crucial in determining whether a litigant
views a settlement value from a gains or loss frame. Research
suggests that litigants' goals can determine reference points.166 A
plaintiff can derive his goal from his "reservation price," which is the
minimum settlement value that he is willing to accept. 6 7 If the
plaintiff sets the reservation price as his reference point, then he will
use it to judge settlement proposals.1 68 A plaintiff will view any
settlement value less than the reference point as a loss and any value
greater as a gain.1 69
Litigation funding can frame a fair settlement offer as a loss by
making the net settlement value appear below a plaintiffs reference
point. In this way, litigation funding causes the plaintiff to reject the
offer and choose the risk-seeking option of trial. A numerical example
of how this works follows. Recall the example in Section III.A: trial
costs are $10,000 each for the plaintiff and defendant, and the plaintiff
has a 50% chance of winning a $100,000 award. The viable bargaining
range is $40,000 to $60,000. Assume that both the plaintiff and
defendant accurately estimate the expected value of trial to be
$50,000. Suppose the plaintiff sets his reservation price (i.e., $40,000)
as his goal and, in turn, sets the goal as his reference point. Thus,
anything short of $40,000 will be considered a loss. Now suppose the
defendant offers $60,000, the maximum amount he is willing to pay. 170
The plaintiff sees this offer as a gain (see Point A in Figure 1), because
$60,000 is $20,000 higher than his reference point of $40,000, and
therefore accepts the offer. But litigation funding changes this result.

165. See Russell Korobkin, Psychological Impediments to Mediation Success: Theory and
Practice, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 281, 310 (2006) ("As the Korobkin and Guthrie
experiment discussed above exemplifies, the range of plausible competing reference points can be
quite context-specific." (citing Korobkin & Guthrie, supranote 17)).
166. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 29
(2002) (explaining how aspiration levels or goals can serve as reference points).
167. See id. at 34 (explaining how the reference point could be the reservation value, or goal,
or both). This Note uses a special scenario when the aspiration point is equal to the reservation
price. However, please note that this is not necessarily the case in all instances. Often, a party's
aspiration point exceeds his reservation price.
168. See id. at 29 ("Negotiators evaluate settlement proposals from the reference
point. . . .").
169. See id. ("Deviations down from their aspiration level are perceived as losses, entailing
feelings of dissatisfaction, while deviations above their aspiration level are perceived as gains,
giving the negotiator a psychological feeling of satisfaction.").
170. Regardless of litigation funding, the defendant's net expected value of trial is $60,000.
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Figure 1. Graphic Depiction of the Numerical Example
Point A: Without
litigation funding,
defendant's $SOK
offer appears here
to plaintifE

Line representing
the plaintiffs
reference point

Gains Frameof$40K

Imagine that the plaintiff obtains a nonrecourse advance of
$18,000 and that the total amount of fees owed to the financier is
$22,000. Assume that $22,000 is the total amount of fees regardless of
whether the plaintiff settles or goes to trial. 171 To the plaintiff, the net
settlement value of a $60,000 offer is $38,000 (i.e., $60,000-$22,000);
the plaintiff does not factor in the initial $18,000 advance because the
plaintiff keeps the advance regardless of repayment. The net expected
value of going to trial is $29,000 (i.e., .50*($100,000-$22,000)$10,000).172

A rational plaintiff will settle rather than go to trial because
the $38,000 net settlement value is greater than the $29,000 net
expected trial value. However, since the plaintiff is irrational (i.e.,
susceptible to framing), he will likely choose trial over settlement
because $38,000 is lower than his reference point of $40,000. Since
$38,000 falls short of the reference point, the offer is viewed in the loss
frame, where the plaintiff is risk seeking (see Point B in Figure 1).
Therefore, the plaintiff is willing to take a gamble in hopes of
winning.1 73
In Rancman, the Ohio Supreme Court inadvertently provided a
two-sentence example of the aforementioned framing effect that

171. The purpose of this assumption is to ensure that the effect of litigation funding that
this example illustrates does not depend on the contractual incentive to settle resulting from
higher fees for trial.
172. Recall that because of the nonrecourse nature of litigation funding, the $22,000 gets
subtracted out only if the plaintiff wins. In contrast, the trial costs are incurred no matter what.
173. If the plaintiff eventually wins, he obtains $68,000 (i.e., $100,000-$22,000-$10,000).
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litigation funding can have on an irrational plaintiff: "Suppose
Raneman [the plaintiff] decides that she will settle for nothing less
than $80,000 ... . Because of the obligation to repay the advances, she

would refuse to settle until [the defendant] offers $98,000."174 To put
this example in the context of the analysis of this Note, $80,000 is the
plaintiffs reference point. The total amount of fees due to the financier
is $18,000 (i.e., $98,000-$80,000).176 The plaintiff will accept a
settlement offer only if the offer is at least equal to the reference point
(i.e., $80,000) plus the litigation-funding fees (i.e., $18,000).
Otherwise, the offer will seem like a loss, and the plaintiff will likely
choose to go to trial. In sum, litigation funding can cause a fair
settlement offer to appear as a loss and decrease the likelihood that a
case will settle.
IV. DEFLATING OVEROPTIMISM AND REFRAMING FAIR SETTLEMENT

OFFERS
In Part III, this Note showed that litigation funding may
impede settlement in two ways: the exacerbation of self-serving bias
and the framing of fair settlement values as losses. Part IV presents
three potential solutions to alleviate these negative effects of litigation
funding: (1) banning litigation funding, (2) attorneys helping in a
system where litigation funding is unregulated, and (3) financier
mandatory information disclosure. This Part argues that the third
option is the best choice.
Banning litigation funding, a pure paternalistic regulation,
would substitute institutional choice for individual choice and prevent
the realization of CLF benefits, such as the equalization of bargaining
power between poor plaintiffs and wealthy defendants. A system
where litigation funding is not regulated would allow for individual
choice, and attorneys could help plaintiffs make wealth-maximizing
settlement decisions. However, in such a system, the presence of
financiers would interfere with attorneys' efforts to deflate
overoptimism and reframe fair settlement offers. Thus, the best
approach is to mandate the disclosure of financiers' case-value
estimates, an asymmetrically paternalistic policy. Such a policy would
combat plaintiff irrationality by directly alleviating self-serving bias
and indirectly mitigating the effects of framing.

174. Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 2003).
175. Id. at 221 n.2 ("Th[e] number [$98,000] is the combination of the $80,000 Rancman
desires plus the $10,800 and $1,800 premiums she must pay to FSF and Interim [CLF
financiers], respectively. . . .").
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A. Pure Paternalism:Banning Litigation Funding
Pure paternalistic regulation substitutes institutional (or
governmental) choice for individual (or consumer) choice. 176
Behavioral law-and-economics scholars who support such regulation
argue that people "will make bad choices even when they have the
incentives and information needed to make good ones, and hence, do
themselves harm if left to their own devices."17 7 Thus, from their
perspective, regulation is a device to protect people from hurting
themselves. 178 This Section presents a CLF ban, which is a pure
paternalistic regulation, as a potential solution to the adverse effects
of CLF on irrational plaintiffs and then contends that this approach is
ultimately undesirable from a consumer standpoint.
Arguably, nonrecourse advances cause plaintiffs to reject fair
settlement values and thus hurt themselves by not maximizing their
expected wealth. Banning litigation funding is a pure paternalistic
policy that removes this service from the market and, in turn,
eliminates CLF's negative effects on irrational plaintiffs. This is
comparable to the policy that the Ohio Supreme Court created via its
holding in Rancman.179 Because of the concern that litigation funding
disincentivizes settlement, the court voided the CLF contract at hand
under doctrines against champerty and maintenance.18 0
While an outright ban of litigation funding would resolve
concerns about the obstruction of settlement, it has two major
weaknesses. First, this policy does not recognize that both rational
and irrational plaintiffs obtain litigation funding. An outright CLF
ban would benefit irrational plaintiffs but not rational plaintiffs (i.e.,
those who do not make cognitive errors). In fact, this policy would
restrict rational plaintiffs' use of a service that could potentially help
them. Second, this policy disregards the benefits of litigation funding
to cash-strapped plaintiffs.1 8 1 As discussed in Section II.A, litigation
funding is often a plaintiffs last resort to obtain money to meet basic
needs and serves to equalize bargaining power between a poor
plaintiff and wealthy defendant. Ultimately, an outright CLF ban is

176. See Rachlinski, supra note 103, at 1165 ("Recognition of the fallibility of human
judgment and the research that identifies this fallibility commonly inspire calls for imposing
constraints on individual choice.").
177. Id. at 1166.
178. Id.
179. 789 N.E.2d at 221.
180. Id.
181. See supraSection II.A.
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undesirable because no plaintiff-rational or irrational, indigent or
affluent-could reap the benefits of the service.
B. System with No Regulation: Help from Attorneys
A regime of no CLF regulation would allow for individual
choice and the realization of the service's benefits, whereas a CLF ban
would not. This Section explores a system in which litigation funding
is unregulated and attorneys serve to alleviate plaintiffs' cognitive
biases. This Section then suggests that a lack of CLF regulation is not
optimal because the presence of financers may interfere with
attorneys' efforts to debias irrational plaintiffs.
In a world without CLF regulation, irrational plaintiffs ideally
would learn to make better future litigation choices by obtaining
feedback on past litigation decisions. 182 However, CLF plaintiffs rarely
have the opportunity to obtain corrective feedback because they are
typically not repeat players in the judicial system. Even if a plaintiff
has previously experienced an unfavorable judgment at trial, that
plaintiff is more likely to believe he lost due to an unfair judge or jury
than due to the plaintiffs own cognitive biases. 183
Due to their unfamiliarity with litigation, most CLF plaintiffs
hire an attorney. Attorneys are trained to carefully and unemotionally
analyze lawsuits.18 4 Studies have shown that attorneys evaluate cases
differently than laypersons.1 85 Attorneys often employ expected-value
calculations in deciding whether to recommend settlement or trial. 186
Having worked with various clients, attorneys are aware of cognitive
biases that can cloud a plaintiffs judgment.18 7 Thus, attorneys can
help irrational plaintiffs avoid cognitive pitfalls. 188

182.

See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT

HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 90-91 (2008) (stating that feedback can help facilitate better
human choices); Rachlinski, supra note 103, at 1212 ("Several studies suggest that experts who
consistently receive unbiased feedback learn to avoid egocentric biases.").
183. Babcock et al., supranote 116, at 921.
184. Korobkin & Guthrie, supranote 95, at 87.
185. See, e.g., id. at 113 ("Our lawyer subjects were not affected to nearly the same degree as
our litigant subjects by the framing, anchoring, and equity-seeking variables tested.").
186. See, e.g., id. at 101 ("By and large, lawyers indicated that they used expected value
calculations to decide whether to recommend settlement or trial.").
187. See Ward Edwards & Detlof von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and Their
Implications for the Law, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 225, 273 (1986) ("No lawyer worth his or her salt will
accept the client's view of the problem, how it arose, or what is the most attractive solution. The
reason is in part that we have intuited the findings of the literature on cognitive illusions. . . .").
188. See Rachlinski, supra note 103, at 1216 ("Many professionals offer more than just
knowledge-they offer a better decisionmaking perspective.").
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Merely informing plaintiffs of the effects of self-serving bias
and framing will not prevent cognitive errors. 8 9 In order to deflate a
plaintiffs overoptimism, an attorney should encourage the plaintiff to
thoroughly consider the weaknesses of the case. 9 0 An attorney should
also anticipate the possibility that litigation funding could exacerbate
the plaintiffs self-serving bias and accordingly inform the plaintiff
that CLF application approval does not constitute the financier's
endorsement of the case.
In order to combat the negative effects of framing, an attorney
should recalibrate a plaintiffs reference point so that trial appears to
be a loss.19 The attorney should inform the plaintiff that trial costs
are hefty and settlement costs are close to zero.1 92 Many personalinjury plaintiffs perceive trial as costless because they are paying
their attorney on a contingency-fee basis.19 However, this perception
is wrong since plaintiffs often have to pay some litigation costs out-ofpocket. 9 4 Moreover, trial is emotionally taxing and time-consuming.19 5
By emphasizing these costs when presenting a settlement offer with a
value higher than the net expected trial value, the attorney can frame
trial as a loss, and loss aversion will likely compel the plaintiff to
choose settlement over trial.
A regime of no regulation for litigation funding heavily relies
on the ability of attorneys to correct plaintiffs' cognitive errors. Some
argue that attorneys are unable to help plaintiffs because attorneys

189. See Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, ExplainingBargainingImpasse: The Role of
Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 115 (1997) ("[B]eing informed of the bias had no
effect on the discrepancy in the parties' expectations, nor on the likelihood of settlement.");
Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 95, at 115-20 (finding that telling plaintiffs about the effect of
framing did not cause a statistically significant increase in the preference for settlement).
190. See Babcock et al., supra note 116, at 920 ("When subjects consciously considered the
weaknesses in their case or reasons that the judge might rule against them, their judgments
exhibited no self-serving bias.").
191. See Korobkin, supra note 165, at 314 ("In order to avoid an impasse that results from
the framing of a risky choice, the mediator should attempt to change the reference point from
which the disputant evaluates the possibility of settlement, such that settlement appears to be a
gain rather than a loss."). Note that the attorney should only emphasize the heavy costs of trial if
his client leans toward rejecting a fair settlement offer due to framing.
192. See id. at 315 ("An alternative approach is for the mediator to attempt to focus the
parties' attention on the differential transaction costs of settlement and continued litigation.").
193. Id. Typically, in CLF cases, the consumer is a personal-injury plaintiff whose attorney
is representing him on a contingency-fee basis. GARBER, supra note 4, at 9.
194. Korobkin, supranote 165, at 315.
195. See Rodak, supra note 33, at 520 ("The costs reduced by settlement are not just
monetary, though; they also include, among others, the emotional cost of stress related to
impending trials and lengthy disputes as well as the opportunity cost of what is forsaken by
devoting time to preparing for and attending trial.").

2015] LITIGATION FUNDING AT THE BARGAINING TABLE

293

are susceptible to the same cognitive biases that plague plaintiffs. 196
However, this concern is likely unwarranted. Attorneys are repeat
players in the legal system. 197 Each time an attorney brings a case, he
has an opportunity to obtain feedback by observing the result.
Regardless of whether an attorney attributes his losses to unfair
judges and juries or suffers from cognitive biases, he will learn to
identify how judges and juries think in order to successfully evaluate
future cases and navigate his clients through the legal system.
Perhaps a more realistic concern in a system without CLF
regulation is that the presence of financiers may interfere with
attorneys' efforts to debias irrational plaintiffs. An irrational plaintiff
likely perceives the financier as an expert in case valuation-an
expert that is endorsing the plaintiffs case assessment by approving
the CLF application. Without regulation, litigation funding may create
a "battle of the experts" (attorney v. financier) in the plaintiffs mind
and undermine the attorney's efforts to debias the plaintiff. For
instance, if the financier approves the plaintiffs CLF application, the
attorney may have difficulty maintaining the plaintiffs trust when he
attempts to deflate the plaintiffs overoptimistic case-value estimate.
C. Asymmetric Paternalism:FinancierMandatory
Information Disclosure
An alternative to both pure paternalistic regulation and no
regulation is asymmetrically paternalistic regulation.19 8 A policy is
asymmetrically paternalistic if it largely benefits irrational actors-by
counteracting their cognitive errors-and imposes little to no costs on
rational actors. Such a policy does not substitute institutional choice
for individual choice but rather attempts to foster better individual
choice. This Section contends that a mandatory information-disclosure
196. Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, How Lawyers' Intuitions Prolong
Litigation, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 571, 579-80 (2013) ("[L]awyers make overly optimistic assessments
of cases that might lead them to litigate when they should settle . . . . Other research suggests
that lawyers are prone to making overly risky decisions to avoid losing .... ).
197. See Catherine T. Harris et al., Does Being a Repeat Player Make a Difference? The
Impact of Attorney Experience and Case-Picking on the Outcome of Medical Malpractice
Lawsuits, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHIcs 253, 282 ("The medical malpractice compensation
system may be inefficient, but it is rational. Meritorious claims are more likely to be paid than
non-meritorious claims. The status of plaintiffs counsel as a repeat player, skilled at evaluating
cases, is the basis for the system's rationality.").
198. See Camerer et al., supra note 18, at 1212 (acknowledging that there are rational and
irrational consumers); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and
Paternalism, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 207, 208-09 (2006) ("With the notable exceptions of a critique by
Greg Mitchell and an article by Colin Camerer and his coauthors endorsing a soft form of
paternalism, [behavioral law and economics] wholly embraces that nomothetic assumption.").
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policy, which is an asymmetrically paternalistic regulation, is the best
response to the negative effects of litigation funding on settlement.
A policy that requires financiers to disclose their case-value
estimates to litigation-funding plaintiffs would greatly benefit
irrational plaintiffs without imposing costs on rational plaintiffs. This
policy should require disclosure only after the CLF contract is final
and binding. This would ensure that plaintiffs do not apply for funding
solely to get a free second opinion from financiers. For example, in
Ohio, where the law allows for a five-day, penalty-free cancellation
period, disclosure of the case-value estimate should be required after
this period. 199
Mandatory disclosure would benefit irrational plaintiffs
because it would directly alleviate self-serving bias by negating the
endorsement effect and indirectly mitigate framing by aligning the
opinions of the financier and the attorney in the plaintiffs mind. First,
knowledge of the financier's case-value estimate would negate the
endorsement effect. Rather than speculating that the financier
supports the plaintiffs case assessment, the plaintiff would know the
financier's actual case valuation. Second, disclosure of the financier's
valuation would end the battle of the experts in the plaintiffs mind.
Because both the financier and attorney have experience assessing
cases and likely use expected-value calculations in doing so, the
financier's estimate would generally confirm the attorney's
estimate. 200 The financier's confirmation would bolster the attorney's
credibility and create an environment where the attorney could
effectively help alleviate a client's cognitive biases. This attorneyfinancier alignment is important during settlement: the plaintiff
should have full confidence in the attorney's case assessment since the
attorney-not the financier-sits at the bargaining table with the
plaintiff. 201
Further, mandatory disclosure would not hurt rational
plaintiffs. As noted in Part III, rational plaintiffs employ deductive
199. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (West 2014); see supra tbl. 1 (showing the state
litigation-funding statutes that have this penalty-free cancellation period).
200. See Rachlinski, supra note 103, at 1216-17 (presenting financial managers and
attorneys as examples of professionals who can avoid cognitive pitfalls in decisionmaking).
201. See Wistrich & Rachlinski, supra note 196, at 578:
Although decisions about whether and when to settle ultimately belong to the client,
lawyers play an important role in the settlement process. They attempt to predict the
likely outcome of cases, and advise their clients about which settlement offers to
make, when to make them, and which settlement proposals to accept.
The attorney has a duty to deflate overoptimism and reframe fair offers during settlement
negotiations so that his client will get the best outcome. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
pmbl. (2013) ("[A] lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client . . . .").
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logic and maximize wealth in making decisions. 202 They do not suffer
from self-serving bias when assessing cases. Financiers are also not
subject to self-serving bias in the case-valuation process. This is
because the financier has no affiliation with, and no obligation to take
on, the case at the time the CLF application is evaluated. 203 Thus,
compared to plaintiffs and even attorneys, the financiers are in the
best position to estimate the case value. Because the case assessments
of both rational plaintiffs and financiers are not skewed by cognitive
biases, the financiers' case-value estimates would only serve to
confirm rational plaintiffs' estimates.
Among the three proposed solutions in this Part, financier
mandatory information disclosure is the best response to the potential
adverse effects of litigation funding on settlement. In addition to the
benefits described above, disclosure may help correct the plaintiff's
initial self-serving bias, not just the additional bias induced via the
endorsement effect. If a plaintiff initially has self-serving bias, then
there would be a discrepancy between his estimate and the financier's
estimate. Hearing the financier's estimate would prompt the plaintiff
to reconcile this discrepancy by reexamining the strengths and
weaknesses of the case. This reexamination may lead the plaintiff to
embrace the financier's case assessment, which is unaffected by selfserving bias. Finally, unlike a CLF ban, mandatory information
disclosure would allow for individual choice and the realization of CLF
benefits, such as the equalization of bargaining power between poor
plaintiffs and wealthy defendants.
V. CONCLUSION

Trial is costly. 2 04 Settlement saves the resources of litigants
and the judicial system. 205 Accordingly, it is critical to analyze the
effect of nonrecourse advances on settlement when deciding whether
to regulate, or even allow, these advances. In the discourse on this
issue, most proponents and critics of litigation funding have assumed

202. Camerer et al., supra note 18, at 1212.
203. See Rachlinski, supra note 103, at 1216 (discussing how financial managers can avoid
overconfidence problems when selecting investments).
204. See Rodak, supra note 33, at 520 ("The costs reduced by settlement are not just
monetary, though; they also include, among others, the emotional cost of stress related to
impending trials and lengthy disputes as well as the opportunity cost of what is forsaken by
devoting time to preparing for and attending trial.").
205. Id.
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a rational plaintiff. 2 0 6 Employing a behavioral law-and-economics
framework,

this Note

provides

an

examination of the effect of

litigation funding on irrational plaintiffs. First, this Note shows that a
nonrecourse advance may impede settlement at the judgment stage by
exacerbating an irrational plaintiffs self-serving bias through an
endorsement effect. Second, this Note shows that a nonrecourse
advance may impede settlement at the choice stage by causing a fair
offer to seem like a loss to an irrational plaintiff who is susceptible to
framing.
While an outright ban of litigation funding seems attractive in
light of plaintiff irrationality, this Note argues that the less heavyhanded policy of financier mandatory information disclosure is the
better solution. Financiers should be required to disclose case-value
estimates to plaintiffs who have obtained nonrecourse advances. This
policy would help an irrational plaintiff avoid cognitive pitfalls, by
negating the endorsement effect, and increase the plaintiffs
confidence in his attorney. In this way, disclosure would foster an
environment in which attorneys could help effectively deflate
overoptimism and reframe fair settlement offers. Moreover, this policy
would allow the benefits of litigation funding to be realized because
individual consumers could choose whether or not to employ the
service. Thus, financier mandatory information disclosure is the ideal
approach for addressing litigation funding's potential adverse effects
on settlement.
Jean Xiao*

206. See, e.g., Rodak, supra note 33, at 522 (discussing the effect of litigation funding on a
"rational plaintiff').
*
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